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Ubiquitous Media and Monopolies of Knowledge: The Approach of
Harold Innis1
Chapter 10 in Michael Daubs and Vincent Manzerolle (eds.), From Here to Ubiquity: Critical and
International Perspectives on Mobile and Ubiquitous Media. New York: Peter Lang (forthcoming 2017),
pp. 183-200.

Edward Comor, University of Western Ontario
Harold Adams Innis (1894–1952) began his career as a political economist and
economic historian but beginning in the 1930s he turned his attention more to questions
concerning culture, media, and civilizational survival. Known today mainly for his
“staples theory” of development and what came to be called “medium theory,” in
retrospect, Innis charted the foundations of a broadly conceptualized dialectical
materialist analysis of ubiquitous media. It is in relation to this that Innis forged a
concept that is particularly germane to the subject of this book: what he called
monopolies of knowledge.2
Ubiquitous media, for Innis, are developed and used as means of organizing and
sustaining power-laden social relations. More than the presence of a pervasive
technology (in a contemporary context smartphones and automobiles, for example), in
addressing ubiquity Innis was referencing media (broadly defined to include institutions,
organizations, and technologies3) that constitute means of producing and reproducing a
given socio-economic order.4 Innis, having analyzed over four thousand years of
history, found that the predominance or ubiquity of some media in a given place and
time reflects and affects—they mediate—that society’s power relations in complex and
often contradictory ways.
In this chapter, Innis’ approach to ubiquitous media will be outlined. It will focus on
how and why such media influence taken-for-granted thinking in a given place and time.
To explain, the concept “monopoly of knowledge” is applied to two ubiquitous media of
Innis’ time: the price system and printing. In the first section, some background
concerning the bases of his interest in media and monopolies of knowledge is provided.
In the second, what might be called Innis’ approach to ubiquitous media is presented
and this, in the third section, is demonstrated through the examples of the price system
and printing. In the penultimate section, his approach is loosely applied to the
contemporary ubiquity of digital communications technologies. Finally, in the chapter’s
conclusion, key parts of the argument presented will be summarized and Innis’
admonition against those treating such an approach as some kind of prognosticative
template is underlined.
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As I explain in what follows, the ubiquity of a medium or complex of media generally
facilitates status quo relations and thinking but, in so doing, it also tends to ossify or
“bias” that culture’s capacities in relation to knowledge. Ubiquity or monopolization thus
implies problems and these can impel alternative developments involving, prospectively
(but not inevitably), a re-casting of the monopolies of knowledge. For Innis, ubiquity
reflects, shapes, and yields conditions that are contradictory for both dominant interests
and, in most cases, even those who oppose them.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
In the Preface of his book Political Economy in the Modern State, Innis (1946)
references the apprehensions expressed by Socrates concerning writing and its
implications for memory: through their use of “written characters” learners “will be
hearers of many things and have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and
will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom
without the reality.” In the same paragraph, Innis relates this warning to the printing
press and radio, stating that they also “have enormously increased the difficulties of
thought” (Innis 1946, vii).
Here and elsewhere Innis recognizes the Promethean paradox of humanity’s mastery
over nature: the advance of science and technology, essential as they are to
civilizational advance, also imply the shackling of the intellect. Indeed, for him, a turning
point for Western civilization was the invention of the printing press. With the ubiquity of
the printed word, mechanized ways of thinking flourished. Modern printing technologies
and their commercial and political applications mediated a certain inter-subjective
mentality that was decidedly unreflexive (i.e., an absence of critical self–awareness).
This, from Innis’ perspective, reflected and furthered the capacity to manage,
administrate, and control—to apply power—on an unprecedented scale. Unreflexive
and present-minded norms of thinking thus were both consciously promoted (especially
through advertising, the price system, and mass democracy) and structured into the
relations of daily life.
Innis, in the mid-1940s, drawing from the classical dialectic between power (or force)
and knowledge (or intelligence), points to the growing predominance of power over
knowledge with technologies, organizations, and institutions mediating their
(prospectively tragic) imbalance. The struggle between power and knowledge is, for
Innis, universal in the history of civilization while the specific implications of such
institutional, organizational, and technological media are not. To underline this, in
addition to Prometheus, Innis references the myth of Minerva.5
Innis begins his first dedicated historical analysis of the role played by
communications in civilizational history (in his paper “Minerva’s Owl”) as follows:
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“Minerva’s owl begins its flight in the gathering dusk not only from classical Greece but
in turn from Alexandria, from Rome, from Constantinople, from the republican cities of
Italy, from France, from Holland, and from Germany” (Innis 1951, 5). Minerva is the
goddess who embodies force and wisdom. Derived from Athena, she represents the
dynamic tension between power and knowledge. Her owl—a bird of prey—scavenges
marginal cultures seeking the materials and ideas needed to sustain and reproduce.
Rather than just looting or emulation, knowledge can be developed in creative ways
with the support of power, and power, in turn, is regenerated through living forms of
knowledge (“living” knowledge refers to forms developed and used to be thoughtful and
creative while “dead” forms are crafted and applied to administer and control).6 When
and where this balance takes place, civilization can adapt in the face of crises.7
However, when power dominates and its agents do not understand their long-term need
for living knowledge, collapse beckons (Watson 2006, 306–312).
The owl—once an extension of Minerva’s wisdom—provides Innis with a metaphor
for the status and treatment of knowledge in the twentieth century. Scholars and other
intellectuals now are subservient; they furnish the powerful—primarily the state and
corporations—with tools and techniques needed to administer and control. The powerful
perpetuate themselves but, under these imbalanced conditions, the creative capacities
that knowledge and wisdom entail are eradicated.
More than just a resource to help his contemporaries assess their political-cultural
conditions with some perspective, Innis, more ambitiously, drew on such mythologies
and the histories of ancient empires as means of assessing what shapes the
parameters of cultural capacities. What he referenced as “the Greek tradition” (1946,
65) was, arguably, the fulcrum of this perspective.
Before the invention of the Greek alphabet, communication through writing in the
Near East was inaccessible to all but a small number of mostly religious elites whose
mastery over an esoteric and thus sacred language separated them and the media they
monopolized from the vernacular. Their diffusion of knowledge to others mostly involved
rituals and ecstatic modes of learning. In Greece, the oral tradition—reliant on myth,
song, poetry, and performance—was itself similarly limiting (a limitation to rational
thinking that Plato, for one, criticized). Writing using a phonetic alphabet, however,
enabled people to counterbalance the dominance of their ears and an ecstatic
education to instead use their eyes through script. Emotive rituals now could be
complimented or countered through a widely accessible communications system
removed from the spoken word. As such, the individual’s ordering of his/her own ideas
(and thus sense of individualism) was significantly advanced (Watson 2006, 370).
In terms of the dialectic between power and knowledge, this and many other
examples demonstrate the complexity in Innis’ work—a complexity that is almost
certainly purposeful. References to power and knowledge invite readers to actively
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engage their intellectual capacities and Innis, in keeping with this method of
presentation, refused to champion some form of media determinism. As he puts it in the
first paragraph of The Bias of Communication (1951), the papers in that book are an
attempt to answer the question “Why do we attend to the things to which we attend?”
Innis then tells us that “They do not answer the question but are reflections stimulated
by a consideration of it. They emphasize the importance of communication in
determining ‘things to which we attend’ and suggest also that changes in
communication will follow changes in ‘the things to which we attend’” (xliii).
Here Innis states that changes in communication follow changes in the things to
which we attend. Innis’ concept of bias clearly is not about the inherent conceptual and
sensual orientations inscribed through media; bias, instead, is a heuristic tool used to
assess the historical determinants shaping power-knowledge dialectics. Rather than a
master concept applied to find the truth, bias is applied as a means of investigating why
dominant truths are conceptualized as they are. In fact, bias served an almost
secondary role for Innis—secondary and supportive to his more general concerns
regarding power relations and what he termed “monopolies of knowledge.”
INNIS’ APPROACH TO UBIQUITOUS MEDIA
Through monopolies of knowledge we find what is, in essence, Innis’ approach to
ubiquitous media. For him, space and time are the two fundamental indices of human
existence, not just organizationally but also in terms of perception and understanding.
The need to comprehend and control both is, for him, a profound and complex endeavor
not least because they are the subjects of ongoing change. “The concepts of time and
space,” he writes, “must be made relative and elastic and the attention given by the
social scientist to problems of space should be paralleled by attention to problems of
time” (Innis 1946, 34. Emphases added).
Controlling or monopolizing knowledge—control over both the information available
and how it is interpreted—prospectively takes place through predominant and, certainly,
ubiquitous media.8 Media, in effect, enable not only a dominant way of organizing
society, they also facilitate appropriate or common sense ways of thinking. There is, in
fact, a link between the development or presence of ubiquitous media and such
monopolies but it is not a direct causal relationship. Moreover, the use of a ubiquitous
medium does not itself yield a monopoly of knowledge, but in its absence, the capacity
to develop and sustain such a monopoly is questionable.
For Innis, media are the relational environments through which human interactions
take place. They reflect and influence biases. Biases, generally, constitute our
conceptual capacities—the parameters in which information and experience are
processed into what is knowable. Simply put, how a medium is structured—whether it is
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writing, the price system, a bureaucracy, or the Internet—influences how people using it
think. Ultimately, the materialization of such biases through social structures and a
society’s inter-subjectivities constitute the framework for what is thinkable and
imaginable.9
Over the long course of civilizational history, Innis tells us that empires come and go
alongside their capacity (or incapacity) to sustain and control political economic
activities. In this longue durée analysis, ubiquitous media constitute crucial intellectual
and structural nodal points through which social-economic relations are established and
extended over time and space. The development and maintenance of an empire thus
involves the capacity to recognize and respond to the endogenous and exogenous
problems that such mediated conditions entail. Media are developed, entrenched, or
reformed in response. Successful empires can do this while others fall into crises.
Informing this historical pattern was, to repeat, a dialectic that Innis was familiar with
in part through his encounters with the work of classicists—that between power and
knowledge. Power (involving coercive mechanisms and force) needs knowledge (often
in the hands of specialists and elites) that can be applied to organization and
administration. Those in commanding positions (particularly political, economic, and
military leaders) tend to focus on such dimensions to the neglect of more reflexive and
critical forms of knowledge (knowledge usually produced by intellectuals, artists, and
even political dissenters). In other words, those in power occupying the centre or core
are compelled to dominate the intellectual and political margins. The core, however,
needs what the margins produce—from wealth to creative thinking—in order to (at least
in the long term) reproduce itself. Power’s necessary dominance over knowledge thus
constitutes a threat to itself.
Power tends to dominate knowledge—promoting and using what Innis would refer to
as “dead” forms of knowledge—yet power also needs another kind of
knowledge—”living” knowledge—in order to successfully respond to the (inevitable)
problems facing the system or empire. In sum, living (self-reflective, creative, critical)
forms of knowledge are needed as a resource for thinking differently; to, in effect,
counterbalance the tendency towards a monopolization of knowledge. As Innis (1951,
34) recognizes (and warns) in The Bias of Communication,
The use of a medium of communication over a long period will to some extent
determine the character of knowledge to be communicated and suggest that its
pervasive influence will eventually create a civilization in which life and flexibility will
become exceedingly difficult to maintain.
A sustainable society, empire, or civilization thus must possess the capacity to resist its
own biases and ossification. This capacity is not (simplistically) the outcome of some
kind of liberal tolerance of marginal groups who wish to communicate and express
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themselves (i.e., outcomes of, in a contemporary context, access to the Internet and
entrenched civil and speech rights). Such human rights, while theoretically desirable,
are not directly equated, in Innis, with the capacity to think reflexively and produce living
forms of knowledge.10 Nor is this capacity seen to be an inevitable outcome of an
individual’s or group’s marginalized status. Instead, Innis recognizes that a monopoly of
knowledge can engulf not just elites but also a society’s most exploited and intellectually
radical elements.
With this and the overarching power-knowledge dialectic in mind, we can read one of
Innis’ most widely cited passages with some precision. In Empire and Communications,
he outlines his oft-quoted theory of technology and time/space bias:
The concepts of time and space reflect the significance of media to civilization. Media
that emphasize time are those that are durable in character, such as parchment, clay,
and stone…. Media that emphasize space are apt to be less durable and light in
character, such as papyrus and paper. The latter are suited to wide areas in
administration and trade….Materials that emphasize time favour decentralization and
hierarchical types of institutions, while those that emphasize space favour
centralization and systems of government less hierarchical in character. Large-scale
political organizations such as empires must be considered from the standpoint of
two dimensions, those of space and time. Empires persist by overcoming the bias of
media which overemphasizes either dimension. They have tended to flourish under
conditions in which civilization reflects the influence of more than one medium, and in
which the bias of one medium towards decentralization is offset by the bias of
another medium towards centralization. (Innis 1950, 5. Emphases added)
The reader will note that Innis, in relating media to an empire’s control over space or
time, stresses how their characteristics emphasize propensities, not concrete
necessities, and that they entail tendencies rather than determining factors. Media, in
other words, imply the structuring of capacities—the parameters of what is possible or
impossible, imaginable or unimaginable. Spatial or temporal biases emerge from the
use of technological, organizational, and institutional mediators in the pursuit and
administration of (or resistance to) power. The predominance of particular mediators in
a given place and time reflects and tends to perpetuate general biases. These biases
are shaped by and, in turn, shape the formation of particular ways or systems of
thinking and, more abstractly, monopolies of knowledge.
In most of his writings Innis uses the concept of a monopoly of knowledge liberally. In
“Minerva’s Owl,” for example, he writes that
I have attempted to suggest that Western civilization has been profoundly influenced
by communication and that marked changes in communications have had important
implications…I have attempted to trace the implications of the media of
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communication for the character of knowledge and to suggest that a monopoly or an
oligopoly of knowledge is built up to the point that equilibrium is disturbed. (Innis
1951: 3)
In just this paper, Innis lists an array of influential technologies (most directly clay, the
stylus, cuneiform script, papyrus, the brush, hieroglyphics and hieratic writing, the pen,
the alphabet, parchment, paper, printing, the printing press, celluloid, and radio) in what
can be read as an overview of the rise and fall of monopolies of knowledge. Also, Innis
addresses the development and implications of many dozens of other
media—technologies, organizations, and institutions. For example, the ancient
development of the horse and chariot facilitated the unity of city states primarily through
the use of force but also through the corporal awareness of Rome’s power that this
military technology entailed. The use of coins after 700 BCE provided for both the
flexible development of market systems and the capacity to further abstractify the nature
of human relationships. The development of libraries and museums enabled both the
conservation and utilization of the past. The Roman contract clarified obligations and
reduced the costly need for public ceremony. The rise of monasticism provided the
Roman Catholic Church with agents who reproduced (selections of) written knowledge
while also promoting faith and the bible throughout Europe. The rise of commerce
involved institutions that encouraged exchange, individualism, and order. Advertising
promoted aspects of existing reality and stimulated new and more abstract realities. In
these and many other examples, institutions, organizations, and technologies are
developed, applied, or modified to mediate capacities concerning power and
knowledge. They extend existing relations and open up potentials for their disruption.
THE PRICE SYSTEM AND PRINTING
Let us now be more specific on how the concept “monopoly of knowledge” is related to
Innis’ analyses of ubiquitous media. In this section, I do this through a brief
consideration of two relatively contemporary examples: the price system and printing.
The price system is the predominant means of valuing what people exchange using
monetary representations—representations that, by the twentieth century, constituted a
dominant means of understanding economic relations and policymaking. Innis began
his critique of the price system by demonstrating the inaccurate and even delusional
aspects of its use. What had been a relatively rational measurement of human
preferences in relation to resources became the central mechanism through which
imbalances in (or a disequilibrium between) desires and capabilities were understood
and worked out. Innis thus critiques more than just the price system’s influence in
capitalist development; he also assesses its implications in modern thought.
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The price system is a predominant institution providing unprecedentedly complex
economic relations with both their grease and glue. As such it mediates and
fundamentally influences human thought through its concrete applications and in how it
is used to organize abstract relations and ideas. Assessing its impact, Innis traces the
price system’s development from the efforts of European states to administer
mercantilist activities involving the importation of gold and silver to subsequent
developments in the construction of classical political economy to its use as a means of
managing (and legitimizing) political economic relations promoted by powerful vested
interests. Thus, through its pervasive use, the favored calculations or valuations of
merchants, industrialists, bankers, accountants, state administrators, and others (such
as advertisers and modern corporations) came to take precedence as reified ways of
thinking.
A monopoly of knowledge thus can be structured through the ubiquitous use of such
a medium. More than this, however, Innis was disturbed by how such monopolies
became entrenched in ways of thinking that are largely unperceived and
self-perpetuating. In the case of the price system, through its material and intellectual
pervasiveness, it became a means through which its own faux neutrality was
reproduced and applied in everything from the calculations used to declare war to the
costs and benefits of staying in a marriage. The price system, according to Innis, has
even limited our capacity to imagine the future by funneling our community and personal
values through a prism of monetary and mathematical calculations. “The successful
politician,” writes Innis (1946, 165), “is precluded from policies which indicate class or
self-interest but he is successful in so far as he succeeds in enlisting the support of the
price system.”
The ubiquity of the price system and its largely unspoken advantages for some
interests over others enables its perpetuation and encloses both expert and common
sense thinking in an invisible cage that delimits the boundaries of reality. For example,
given the price system’s institutionalization in the seventeenth century in response to
the vast influx of gold from the new world, he writes that “It would be interesting to
speculate on the history of economic thought if England had been an important
producer of precious metals and not an importer and an exporter” (ibid., 146). The price
system, while initially counter-balancing the irrationalities of religion, subsequently
perpetuated biases that enabled control while, in so doing, it also framed the
parameters of creativity.11
The price system’s “dangers,” writes Innis (ibid., ix), “follow obsession and
intolerance to a philosophical interest and skepticism.” It is in this context—the tendency
of “dead” forms of knowledge to overwhelm the “living”—that Innis assesses the first
half of the twentieth century in a way that emphasizes the extraordinary implications of
such intellectual mechanisms:
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The outbreak of irrationality, which in the early part of the twentieth century became
evident in the increasing interest in psychology following the steadying effects of
commerce in the nineteenth century, is the tragedy of our time. The rationalizing
potentialities of the price system and its importance in developing powers of
calculation in the individual have failed to prevent a major collapse. It has been
argued that man as a biological phenomenon has been unable to sustain the
excessive demands of rationalism evident in the mathematics of the price system and
of technology. (Innis 1946: 98–99)
As for another ubiquitous medium—printing—Innis stresses its importance in terms of
what he calls the mechanization of knowledge. Rapid economic growth, particularly
dating from industrialization in the nineteenth century, and the related rise of democracy
and public opinion (mostly through literacy and the commercial press) entailed the
development of media (institutions, organizations, and technologies) enabling growth
and control over workers/consumers/citizens. This complex of developments directly
implied the ubiquitous availability and use of printed forms of communication.
With wood pulp replacing rags as the raw material for newsprint, and with a train of
print technology developments (driven most overtly by the demands of advertisers),
mass market journalism flourished by the end of the nineteenth century. Changes in
other areas of publishing emerged also; changes molded, perhaps most significantly,
through the growing power of voters and consumers. What was called “the new
journalism”—the penny press being an extreme form—was facilitated by (and itself
influenced) broader and deeper cultural developments. In this history, through his
understanding of center-margin relations and the power-knowledge dialectic, Innis saw
media being used in a paradoxical way: power seemingly was being decentralized
through democracy and the rising influence of public opinion but these also constituted
means of controlling polities and markets. The demands of the working class, for
example, were funneled through mediators (such as advertising-sponsored
newspapers) that both fragmented intellectual capacities and incorporated dissent
through another institutional development—mass consumption.
In this process, journalistic and other writing standards were debased. But also in the
context of these changes, some news organizations turned away from “spuriousness”
and, instead, promoted “accuracy and truth,” especially as the former was not in
keeping with the newspaper’s emerging role as the medium of their advertisers
supposed truthfulness (Innis 1946, 27–28). Nevertheless, in seeking to accommodate
mass readerships on behalf of capitalist interests, and in light of the growing competition
facing the press with more sensually-engaging media such as cinema and radio,
newspapers and other printed communications came to demonstrate an antipathy to
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“the deep intensity of thought” (Babe and Comor 2018, n.p.; Sir Walter Scott, quoted in
Innis 1946, 30).
Printing, as a technology developed in conjunction with (and in support of ) other
influential developments, promulgated a general interest in current events, accessible
explanations, and seeing-is-believing standards of “truth” (the latter typically involving
images and statistics). The development of mass education, for example, involved the
state-sponsored rise of textbook publishing. Beyond its political and nationalistic
implications, Innis (ibid., 100) argues that the textbook “has become…a powerful
instrument for the closing of men’s minds” due to, among other things, “its emphasis on
memory and its systematic checking of new ideas” through indexes and their
re-publication as updated editions. “Biases,” Innis continues, “become entrenched in
textbooks which represent monopolies of the publishing trade and resist the power of
thought.”12
Textbooks enabled power (through the state) to manage the dissemination of
knowledge and, in so doing, particular forms of knowledge were perpetuated. Even
Canada’s universities were compelled to conform. They were (and still are), after all,
publicly funded. As such, research and teaching activities—particularly in the context of
a present-minded and price system dominated culture—have to be substantiated in
terms of their demonstrable (as opposed to abstract and long-term) contributions. As
with the newspaper, in the university the timeliness of knowledge and its relevancy to
contemporary (and often fashionable) concerns became increasingly valued. Both
journalism and academia actively perpetuated this shift and the volume, subject matter,
and quality of publications reflected this directly.
The ubiquity of printing enabled an explosion of information and knowledge in largely
debased and vernacular forms and the qualitative dimensions of knowledge were, in
effect, flattened.13 Partially in response to this (and enabled by the unprecedented
availability of print technology), specializations flourished. More than just advertising
and its immediate gratification priorities had come to dominate cultural norms and
intellectual pursuits.
The upshot, for Innis, has been the mechanization (and deadening) of knowledge
and, through this, some disturbing developments. Indeed, Innis characterized the
nineteenth century as a period of relative rationalism while, in light of the changes
mediated through the price system, industrialized printing, and other ubiquitous media,
the twentieth was characterized by an irrationalism yielding “a century of war” (ibid., 55;
Babe and Comor 2018, n.p.). Publications addressing increasingly isolated fields and
sub-fields revealed, for him, a lack of perspective that is both spatial (as with
cross-at-your-own-peril boundaries of expertise) and temporal (especially in terms of the
present-mindedness that most specializations imply).14
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The unprecedented availability of information and the precision afforded by print
technologies constituted something very different from a democratization of knowledge
and the foundations for a more thoughtful society. Academic knowledge, for one thing,
was being produced and thought about in more functional, instrumental, and exacting
terms, rather than in terms of its value as a means of reflection, critique, and even
collective understanding. “Knowledge,” Innis observes, instead “has been divided to the
extent that it is apparently hopeless to expect a common point of view” (Innis 1951,
190). According to Innis (1946, 126):
The rapid growth of bureaucracies recruited from highly specialized social sciences
has brought the rapid growth of ecclesiasticism and the rapid decline of scepticism.
Democracies are becoming people who cannot understand, run by people buttressed
and protected by the ramparts of research.…[In the words of Locke] ‘The greater part
cannot learn and therefore they must believe.’
The mechanization and mass consumption of printed communications propagated,
through both form and content, the value of the new, the practical, and the intellectually
manageable. This, for Innis, constituted a fundamental contradiction. Industrial scale
printing enabled and embodied a pernicious compounding of the short-term and
unreflexive thinking that had become lauded as an inherently democratic and thus
unimpeachable right. But in the absence of even those on the political and intellectual
margins (for example, many workers as well as artists and intellectuals concentrating on
mostly “living” forms of knowledge) having the capacity to recognize this decline of
thoughtfulness, the ahistorical (if not suicidal) drumbeat of “progress” continued. More
than this, Innis viewed the rapid development of efficient and more “perfect” methods of
communication to be compounding this mostly invisible crisis. Beyond the many
specializations these afford, the power to produce and circulate sounds and images
portraying “reality” would mediate even more time-neglecting forms of knowledge.
Power (Minerva), in effect, was treating knowledge (her owl) as a pet rather than a
means of enlightenment and survival (Watson 2006, 309). The “enormous capacity” of
Western civilization “to loot,” writes Innis (ibid., 102), particularly through the ubiquity of
increasingly realistic mediations, “has left little opportunity for consideration of the
problems which follow the exhaustion of [cultural and intellectual] material to be looted.”
TOWARDS AN INNISIAN APPROACH TO UBIQUITOUS DIGITAL MEDIA
To summarize, the ubiquity of a medium facilitates or provides the capacity for the
emergence or entrenchment of some form of monopoly of knowledge. While the
medium itself does not determine this monopolization, the ways in which a medium
structures, or enables the production and communication of some kinds of information
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over others and some ways of thinking in relation to others are its most germane
implications. The price system and printing demonstrate this and so too might an
Innisian analysis of digital communications technologies.
As with other ubiquitous media, Innis certainly would assess digital technologies in
the context of a complex of political economic and cultural dynamics and in relation to
other influential mediators. Monopolies of knowledge, such as the mechanistic,
specialized, organizational, administrative forms of knowledge dominating much of the
twentieth century (and related biases concerning spatial control to the neglect of time),
are neither automatically perpetuated nor transformed by the wide scale introduction of
such a medium. Moreover, as an historicist, Innis would argue that we cannot fully
comprehend the implications of any emergent technology, organization, or institution
until time gives us the perspective needed to make such an assessment.
Having said this, however, following his efforts to comprehend the uses and
implications of the predominant media of his time, we can at least begin an Innisian
analysis of ubiquitous digital media by recognizing them to have been built within (and
in response to) the parameters of existing media (broadly defined) and the general
dynamics driving (and the capacities framing) their development. The price system, for
example, was and remains an institutionalized means of organizing and facilitating
economic (and other) activities in ways that are constitutive of a particular political
economic order and the values and vested interests it supports. Likewise, printing
enables some powerful interests to maintain or extend their control over a society’s
wealth and common sense thinking involving the capacity to shape public opinion
through education, advertising, and the allocation of or specialized control over such
resources. Viewed historically, the ubiquity of these media has been and remains a
reflection of their enormous usefulness and flexibilities especially (but not exclusively)
as nodal points of power among both status quo and competing interests. If for no other
reason, ubiquitous media become ubiquitous because they are handy to vested
interests. The consequences of their use, however, are not always predictable as the
dynamics and factors shaping history are too complex.
For Innis, history provides us with the potential to assess the present with some
perspective, enabling us to identify general tendencies and patterns that we might apply
to contemporary developments. For one thing, established cultural and economic
capacities and dynamics shape the structuring of emergent media while older media are
compelled to change in response to the demands mediated by the successful new
ones. The owners, editors, and writers of newspapers and books, for example, in their
responses to radio and cinema, modified their products in order to be more attractive
and accessible (mostly through simplifications, sensationalism, photography, color
printing, comics, etc.). Today, in light of the “obvious” advantages of online forms of
journalism, most newsprint versions are deemed to be a waste of time (and
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money)—especially for advertisers—and the book, through its many digitized iterations,
is becoming a hybrid vehicle crafted to engage consumers even more sensually (as
opposed to intellectually) than it had in the past. Through this technological
“progress”—involving the book’s “democratization” and “liberation” from publishers—the
value of concentration, reflection, and long-term considerations (not to mention the
prestige of the author and the written word itself) likely are being further marginalized.15
As Innis (1951, 82–83) observed, such spatially biased developments—i.e., the
unprecedented reach and accessibility of online publications—make it “increasingly
difficult to achieve continuity or to ask for a consideration of the future.”
Part of this annihilation of time involves, for Innis, an understanding of the pressures
facing people in our time—given that “time is money” and “money is time” (George
Gissing quoted in Innis 1951, 83)—and that new media enable us to live more of our
lives without having to engage in the difficult and time-consuming task of
critical/self-reflexive thought. Representations of reality—like assumptions that “Truth” is
the outcome of scientific and mathematical applications—have been perfected through
digital technologies. However, as Innis quotes Geoffrey Scott, “It is…the last sign of an
artificial civilisation when Nature takes the place of art” (Scott quoted in Innis 1951:
193). What Innis means by this becomes apparent in the following excerpt from his
essay “A Plea for Time”:
The effects of new media of communication evident in the outbreak of the Second
World War were intensified during the progress of the war. They were used by the
armed forces in the immediate prosecution of the war and in propaganda both at
home and against the enemy. In Germany moving pictures of battles were taken and
shown in theatres almost immediately afterwards. The German people were given an
impression of realism which compelled them to believe in the superiority of German
arms; realism became not only most convincing but also with the collapse of the
German front most disastrous. In some sense the problem of the German people is
the problem of Western civilization. As modern developments in communication have
made for greater realism they have made for greater possibilities of delusion. (Innis
1951: 81–82. Emphases added)
In the absence of an innate capacity to recognize that information and experience are
not themselves objective realities, the technological mastery of media presents the
individual and the mass public with little room for interpretation (i.e., nature over art). In
this observation, Innis harkens back to the concerns that Plato says were expressed by
Socrates with the advent of the Greek alphabet and writing (as quoted earlier). To
repeat, as Innis (1946, vii) quotes Socrates in Phaedrus, with writing, people will convey
“the show of wisdom without the reality.”
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In a world mediated, regulated, and governed through mostly unquestioned
representations (prices as values; printed words as truths; digital technologies
mimicking concrete experiences), ways of thinking that entail little or no reflection (let
alone historical or philosophical perspective) are normalized. Thoughts, let alone
actionable concerns, about society’s long-term duration thus become further
marginalized; they are deemed to be a waste of time and money, especially in a political
economy and culture that perpetually lacks the former and values, more than anything
else, the latter.
An Innisian analysis, furthermore, would recognize that digital technologies reflect
and extend capitalism’s (and, more generally, power’s) emphasis on timeliness and
efficiency in decision-making and, indeed, daily life itself.16 As with Innis’ recognition
that biases tend to be self-perpetuating, this closing off of reflexive thinking in effect
undercuts critiques concerning the monopoly of mechanized knowledge. In a cultural
environment stressing individualism and efficiency and in the absence of
time-consuming reflexive capacities, all kinds of digitally-mediated communications are
embraced as the priorities and values they facilitate are both pervasive and seemingly
obvious.
Innis, of course, assessing contemporary developments through his historical
perspective and historicist epistemology, underlined that such media-facilitated
monopolies of knowledge are inherently contradictory. Power appears to be served as
Minerva’s owl has been all but caged. Amidst splintering attention spans and
fashion-induced moments of dissent, powerful vested interests (including, when
organized, the citizens of liberal democracies) tend to focus their energies on
management and control rather than conceptualizing (let alone forging) radically
different ways of thinking. More generally, this neglect of time—particularly the value of
understanding history, the time required to reflect, and the imagination and creativity
needed to think about alternatives—compels the Innisian analyst to consider
contemporary developments involving digital technologies to be far less liberating than
many assume them to be. Here we would do well to recall the myth of Prometheus.
From Innis’ study of history—a study driven in part by his quest to develop an
alternate (relatively unbiased) perspective—he tells us that the margins of any political
economic system and culture have the greatest capacity to resist, particularly given their
removal from the full force of the core’s framing dynamics and mediated realities.17 In
their struggles with the core (or political economic empire) they may be compelled to
adapt dominant media in light of their own needs and interests. This, for Innis, is not
necessarily the basis for revolution but, instead, it constitutes an important means of
countering monopolies of knowledge. To use his preferred language, marginal demands
may constitute part of a system’s unused capacities and, thus, new ways of thinking
may emerge as a result of center-margin tensions and dynamics.
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As Innis’ work reveals, however, imperial centers draw from or directly loot the
economic and cultural resources of their margins as they are primary sources for ideas
and innovation. The systemic drives associated with capitalism compel new means of
control, new bases for resistance and, indeed, the potential for cultural vibrancy. But in
our contemporary context, through the price system and other ubiquitous media
(including digital technologies used to educate, advertise, market, and “stay connected
all the time”), Innis’ concerns about spatial control, the mechanization of knowledge,
and an immediate future of misunderstanding and instability appear to be warranted.
CONCLUSIONS
Under the conditions of their contemporary use, digitally mediated communications
provide instantaneous knowledge. Their seeing-is-believing qualities facilitate what Innis
might call the delusion of certainty. Specializations are perpetuated and publics
gravitate towards the less time-consuming and intellectually supportive views of
like-minded others. Arrogance and narcissism deepen as truths are pontificated based
on not much more than experientially-informed reckonings and prejudices. The reach
and perfection of digital communications likely would prompt Innis to reiterate his
statement that:
Enormous improvements in communication have made understanding more difficult.
Even science, mathematics, and music as the last refuge of the Western mind have
come under the spell of the mechanized vernacular. Commercialism has required the
creation of new monopolies in language and new difficulties in understanding. (Innis
1951, 31)
Innis also observes that the introduction a new medium tends to “check the bias of the
first [and dominant medium] and to create conditions suited to the growth of empire”
(Innis 1950, 169). In other words, there is a tendency for power to adjust its course as a
result of the counterbalance to its monopoly of knowledge that may emerge through the
use of a new (and perhaps ubiquitous) medium. Barring complete collapse—a
development that in the twentieth century he associated with another, now
atomic/nuclear, world war—Innis, however, does not anticipate anything remotely
revolutionary.
Perhaps today’s rapid development of ubiquitous digital media constitutes this very
occurrence: digital media somehow constituting a check and counterbalance to print (or,
as McLuhan put it, the dominance of typographical man). Certainly, other ubiquitous
media—such as the price system—are not directly threatened by digitization. However,
a goal of this chapter has been to point out that such general tendencies are, for Innis,
not laws of history. There is no, to borrow from some Marxists, immanent dialectic at
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work (except, arguably, the trans-historical dialectic between power and knowledge).
Innis’ dialectical materialism is, instead, historically conditional in that Innis resisted
what he criticized others for following: ossified schools of thought generating
mechanized forms of knowledge.
Nevertheless, from an Innisian perspective, the transition to digital media seems to
constitute the widening and deepening of pre-existing conditions more than the
mediation of a new period of cultural vibrancy. Certainly something new is taking shape
but, most likely, this is unfolding through an entrenched monopoly of knowledge and,
therefore, the dawning of a more reactionary political culture—”reactionary” on the part
of not just the right and left but the center also.
What Innis provides analysts conducting research on the subject of ubiquitous media
is an approach that compels us to focus on the structural and intellectual capacities at
hand, the complex dynamics and mediations at play, and the generally unseen tensions
and contradictions that may be at work. Innis’ understanding of ubiquitous media is
slippery and complicated and, thus, prone to simplifications bordering on assessments
akin to some kind of media determinism. In this chapter, following Watson (2006), I
have argued that the most productive link to Innis’ concerns is not some straightforward
analysis of media bias but, instead, it is to relate ubiquitous media to monopolies of
knowledge and, more broadly, the dialectic between power and knowledge.
In monopolies of knowledge, assumptions about the truth fatally supersede “the
search for truth” (Innis 1946, 126. Emphasis added). In pursuing questions concerning
the development and implications of ubiquitous media, Innis would underline this very
point as both a guide and a warning.18
NOTES
1. This chapter was written while preparing, with co-editor Robert Babe, the
re-publication of Innis’s Political Economy in the Modern State (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2018). Through that project he played an important role in the
intellectual development of what I present herein, and I recognize that portions of
this chapter echo parts of our work for that book. I also acknowledge the
assistance of Vincent Manzerolle for his thoughtful input during the chapter’s
development. Finally, I am compelled to dedicate this chapter to the late Professor
Ian Parker. His influence on my understanding of Innis’ work has been
immeasurable.
2. Although I have found no direct (let alone sustained) use of the term “ubiquitous
media” in Innis’ work, in what follows I hope to demonstrate his interest in the
subject.
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3. Institutions, in Innis’ works, refer to both formal institutions (such as the Church)
and the more socio-economic (such as the price system). Organizations generally
reference headquartered collectivities such as banks, political parties, or
universities. Technologies, it should be noted, also imply techniques (his
references to print, for instance, involve abilities related to literacy).
4. For Marx, the commodity form (conceptualized as an institution) might be said to
mediate such contemporary relations while, for Innis, what he called the price
system was central in similar (but more limited) ways.
5. Later in his career, during the 1940s, Innis came to appreciate Greek mythology as
an ideal-type form of knowledge in that it embodied both the vibrancy of orality
(particularly at the time of Plato, at the dawn of writing) in conjunction with its
capacity to communicate ontologically objective truths concerning shared
conditions. Alexander John Watson (2006, 301) suggests that Innis’ critique of
monopolies of knowledge drew from similar themes found in Greek mythology.
6. Innis’ understanding of power developed from a political economy-based relational
and structural conceptualization (as in his earlier research on Canadian economic
history) into an approach characterized by a complex of relations in which
power/force and knowledge/intelligence constitute dialectically interdependent
capacities.
7. According to Innis, “The success of organized force is dependent on an effective
combination of the oral tradition and the vernacular in public opinion with
technology and science.” (Innis 1951, 5).
8. Although Innis never used the term ubiquitous to describe an institution,
organization, or technology, the engaged reader can discern quantitative and
qualitative differences between media that are predominant and those that are
ubiquitous at a given place and time. In his six years of dedicated writing on media
and communications (1946–1952), various media such as radio, the automobile,
and roads had become predominant while the price system, print capitalism, and
the state were ubiquitous.
9. Of course, the material properties of media foundationally shape the capacities of
such structures.
10. On democracy as practiced in the mid-twentieth century, quoting François Guizot,
Innis writes that “It readily sacrifices the past and the future to what is supposed to
be the interest of the present” (Innis 1946: 95).
11. In Marx, something very similar can be seen in the predominance of the
commodity form and its profound implications in social relations. Its ubiquity—more
abstract and defining than Innis’ concerns about the price system—mediate
concrete/living relations through the predominance of abstractions.
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12. On the other hand, “Abolition of standard texts in favour of the publication of a
wide variety of books increases the cost of education to the publishers, the state,
and the purchaser of books, but it tends to break down broad stereotypes” (Innis
1946, 162).
13. The first two chapters of Innis’ (1946) Political Economy in the Modern State, for
example, explore and demonstrate this theme through the history of the
newspaper in the United States and Britain and the modern press in England.
14. On this second point, as the interests and exclusionary vocabularies of specialists
develop, their work becomes less accessible to others and, as such, their primary
readership are similarly specialized administrators, scholars, and bureaucrats.
15. It is in this cultural context that pension fund investments and insurance issues
are worth losing sleep over but seemingly abstract concerns involving, for
example, ecological survival or the proliferation of nuclear weapons are, for most,
mere “issues.”
16. More generally, as classical political economists (most notably, Marx) first
recognized, capitalism is a historically unique form of production (and reproduction)
entailing, through legal and other modes of abstractification, a systemic drive to
expand the accumulation of capital and, in the process, shorten the time frames of
all kinds of social relations.
17. Through his direct and indirect references to center-margin and core-periphery
relations, Innis alludes to a range of structural and cultural conditions that, to
repeat, elaborate classical power-knowledge dialectics. His use of space-time
dialectics in his later writings is an obvious example (both alluding to tensions and
contradictions involving the capacity to control and think reflexively). Implicit in this
ever-mediating dynamic is the complexity of hegemonic power, entailing both
coercive and consensual capacities.
18. Indeed, in the first paragraph of his Preface to Political Economy in the Modern
State, Innis writes that “The volume is intended as a guide and as a warning”
(1946, vii).
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